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UST AS THERE are vehicular codes to govern the movement of
motor traffic, so there are admiralty codes to govern the navi-
gation of ships. Admiralty "rules of the road," however, have
their origin in a far more distant past than modern day traffic laws.'
But ancient origins are no justification for outdated rules-the laws
of admiralty must be constantly re-examined in the light of changing
conditions. That constant re-examination and, in some instances, re-
vision is necessary can be seen when one considers, for example, the
differences between the United States and Canadian admiralty laws
and the effect of these differences upon ocean going vessels entering
the United States through the St. Lawrence Seaway.
The Congress of the United States has defined as follows the juris-
dictional limits of the rules of the road applicable to safe navigation
on the Great Lakes within the jurisdiction of the United States:
... [T]he following rules for preventing collisions shall be followed in the
navigation of all public and private vessels of the United States upon the Great
Lakes and their connecting and tributary waters as far east as Montreal and
in the navigation of all other vessels upon such lakes and waters while within
the territorial waters of the United States.2
The Canadian Shipping Act, Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, spells out the Canadian counterpart of this jurisdictional question:
The said regulations to apply and to have force in all navigable waters within
Canada or within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada except the waters
l An excellent discussion of the historical background of admiralty law is found in
GILMORE and BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 1-48 (1957).
2 33 U.S.C.A. S 241 (Supp. 1959).
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of Lakes Superior and Huron, Georgian Bay, Lakes Erie and Ontario, their
connecting and tributary waters and the St. Lawrence River, including the
Ottawa River and its tributary waters, as far east as the lower exit of the Lachine
Canal and the Victoria Bridge at Montreal, Province of Quebec.8
It can be seen from these legislative mandates that it is incumbent
upon those responsible for the safe navigation of vessels to be com-
pletely and adequately cognizant of both the American and the
Canadian rules.
The master and navigators of "salt water" experience coming into
the Great Lakes are well schooled in the International Rules of the
Road, and they have found the Canadian rules more closely akin to
their past training and experience. Upon their entry into these inland
fresh water lakes within the jurisdiction of the United States, how-
ever, they must be constantly alert to the variations in the United
States maritime laws-variations which may seem strange and unreal-
istic to these men of salt water experience. It would behoove a master
coming into the Great Lakes for the first time to have in his personal
file the latest United States Coast Guard publication known as RULES
OF THE ROAD, GREAT LAKES.
4
"MODERATE SPEED"-A DOCTRINE WITH DIFFICULTIES
Under both the Canadian and United States rules, the basic doctrine
of "moderate speed" is one which has given most admiralty lawyers
legal nightmares. In the event of a collision, it is incumbent upon
the master of a vessel to have the mate or someone else who is equally
qualified "cut in"5 the ship's position and mark the exact time of this
"cut" on the chart. Whether or not this is done may spell the differ-
ence between success and failure if litigation follows. Even during
heavy weather performance of the task will not be overly difficult,
because the running D.R.6 track should be a fair indication of the
3 P.C. 1953-1287 (Can. Gaz., pt. II [Aug. 26, 1953]).
4 33 U.S.C.A. S§ 241-295 (Supp. 1959).
5 This is the navigational method of ascertaining a vessel's exact position. It is done
by taking a true bearing on two or more fixed targets, and where the bearing lines
intersect is the exact position of the vessel. (It is a highly developed technique of the
master mariner wherein speed of the vessel is also an ingredient of an accurate position.)
6 This is the abbreviation for "dead reckoning." Dead reckoning is another naviga-
tional term wherein a fairly accurate position of the ship can be ascertained by running
a course line projection from the last known "cut," (as described in note 5 supra)
using the speed of the vessel multiplied by the time that the ship has been on this
specific course. This is another highly skilled technique used by mariners wherein they
must consider the set and the drift, the condition of the hull, and the various peculiari-
UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN ADMIRALTY LAW
ship's exact position. Immediately following a collision at sea, how-
ever, this simple duty may be neglected with the onset of emotions
and the natural reaction of "first things first."
The experienced mariner must be extremely familiar with the ju-
dicial interpretation of rule 15 of the Great Lakes Rules, which is
worded as follows:
Every vessel shall, in thick weather, by reason of fog, mist, falling snow,
heavy rainstorms, or other causes, go at a moderate speed. A steam vessel hear-
ing, apparently not more than four points from right ahead, the fog signal of
another vessel shall at once reduce her speed to bare steerageway, and navigate
with caution until the vessels shall have passed each other.
7
The cases interpreting the Canadian and United States rules have
been extremely consistent in their inquiry as to whether, under condi-
tions of "thick weather," the vessels were traveling at a "moderate
speed." In fact, it will be noted that the following portion of the
abovementioned rule 15 is implied in the leading cases8 in the United
States: "A steam vessel hearing, apparently not more than four points
from right ahead, the fog signal of another vessel shall at once reduce
her speed to bare steerageway. .. "
The Canadian counterpart of rule 15 is Canadian rule 16, which has
been established as follows:
(a) Every vessel, or seaplane when taxi-ing on the water, shall, in fog, mist,
falling snow, heavy rainstorms or any other condition similarly restricting
visibility, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circum-
stances and conditions.
(b) A power-driven vessel hearing, apparently forward of her beam, the fog-
signal of a vessel the position of which is not ascertained, shall, so far as the cir-
cumstances of the case admit, stop her engines, and then navigate with caution
until danger of collision is over.9
The above statutes in no way indicate a discretionary act on the
part of the master of a vessel. The simple Anglo-Saxon word "shall"
is used and used purposely by the legislatures. This is a mandatory
act on the part of the master of the ship. Scheduling of arrival time
ties of the specific vessel. On most vessels today a dead reckoning tack is kept by a
mechanical device which calculates the various elements which have been mentioned
above.
7 33 U.S.C.A. § 272 (Supp. 1959).
8 City of Chicago v. Goodrich Transit Co., 199 Fed. 112 (7th Cir. 1912); Erie &
Western Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 178 Fed. 42 (7th Cir. 1910); The Leland Case,
19 Fed. 771 (N.D. IM. 1884).
9 P.C. 1953-1287 (Can. Gaz., pt. II, rule 16 [Aug. 26, 1953]).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
and consideration of the operational cost of the particular vessel must
yield to this absolute requirement.
FOG SIGNAL DISCREPANCIES
In connection with the last mentioned "moderate speed" rules of
both Canada and the United States, some attention should be paid to
the reference in both laws to "the fog signal" of another ship. Just
what constitutes a fog signal is a point of disagreement between the
Canadian and American rules. Subsection (a) of rule 14 for the Great
Lakes prescribes the fog signal of a steam vessel as follows:
.. shall sound at intervals of not more than 1 minute three distinct blasts
of her whistle.1o
Whereas, Canadian Rule 15 C(i) (which is identical to rule 15 C
(i) of the International Rules") states the following as the required
fog signal:
... shall sound at intervals of not more than 2 minutes a prolonged blast.' 2
The basic purpose of these fog signals is to communicate the status
of one vessel to another; through stare decisis and the rules themselves,
these fog signals are used when the other vessel can not be seen. It is
obvious from the cursory reading of the above rules, however, that
there is a significant legal difference between them in this aspect: The
Canadian (and International) rule prescribes not more than a two
minute interval, and is very specific in the type of blast; whereas,
under the Great Lakes rule the interval is not more than one minute,
and three distinct blasts are required. The master must know these
differences and must insist that they are religiously adhered to while
navigating the Canadian waters and the Great Lakes. An hour or two
conference among the ship's officers concerning these particular rules
may mean the difference between a successful and a financially dis-
asterous voyage.
As early as 1869 the importance of correct and accurate fog signals
was established by the United States Supreme Court in The Pennsyl-
vania case. This decision has been -the outstanding guidepost for
mariners and American admiralty lawyers in their search for safety
at sea. This case, which brought into play both the United States
10 33 U.S.C.A. s 271 (a) (Supp. 1959).
11 33 U.S.CA. 5 145m (c) (i) (Supp. 1959).
12 P.C. 1953-1287 (Can. Gaz., pt. II, rule 15 (c) [Aug. 26, 1953]).
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and British rules of navigation, involved the following facts: The
collision occurred in a thick fog about 200 miles from Sandy Hook in
the track of outward and inward bound vessels. A British bark, un-
derway, with way upon her, was ringing her ship's bell instead of
giving the proper signal on her foghorn. This indicated to other ships
in the area, in accordance with the rules at that time, that this par-
ticular ship was at anchor. However, the bark was moving through
the water with a lashed helm. It was her duty to blow a foghorn in
accordance with the International Rules of the Road, but instead
she was ringing a bell; she was giving a false signal; she was not com-
municating her correct status to the ohter vessels in the area. The
Pennsylvania, a British steam propeller, was proceeding through the
fog, sounding proper fog signals but in direct violation of the "mod-
erate speed" doctrine which has been previously discussed.
The Pennsylvania case established, although it has been modified
and distinguished by later cases, the "basic fault" doctrine of Ameri-
can admiralty law. The Court announced the doctrine in these words:
[When] a ship at the time of collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule
intended to prevent collisions, it is no more than a reasonable presumption that
the fault, if not the sole cause, was at least a contributory cause of the disaster.
In such a case the burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely that her
fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but
that it could not have been. Such a rule is necessary to enforce obedience to
the mandate of the statute .... 13
This case created for the Admiralty practice, a rebuttable presump-
tion of fault once it is established that the ship or ships in collision
were in violation of one of the statutory rules which are designed to
prevent collision. Therefore, it is of extreme importance that the
mariner realize that if, at the time of a collision, he is in violation of
any of these rules, his ship is then "cast" in fault and it becomes
incumbent upon him to show "not merely that her fault might not
have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it
could not have been."'1 4
The above case further points out the supremacy of the legislative
intent manifest in rule 14 (a) of the Great Lakes Rules. It is not the
duty of the Judiciary to substitute its judicial wisdom for the con-
sidered intent of Congress. Further, the Court could not, following
13 The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 136 (1873).
14 Ibid.
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the strict interpretation of the statute, admit the validity of an equiva-
lent signal for that which the statute had made a positive requirement.
THE "GENERAL PRUDENTIAL" AND "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE" RULES
After having established the origin of the basic fault doctrine as
presently found in the admiralty jurisprudence of America, it is only
fitting and proper to consider the "General Prudential" and "Special
Circumstance" Rules, misconception of which seems to have per-
meated the thinking of so many of the master mariners. In many col-
lision cases the master mariner seems to rely on these two so-called ex-
ceptions to the rules of the road to justify his course of action. This
concept of an "exception" to the rules makes it extremely difficult for
counsel to establish with the court that these two rules are either ex-
pressly applicable, depending on the facts, or not applicable consider-
ing all the circumstances.
Rule 27 of the Great Lakes Rules (Canadian rule 27), the so-called
"Special Circumstance Rule," is worded as follows:
In obeying and construing these rules due regard shall be had to all dangers
of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances which may render
a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger. 15
The "General Prudential Rule" embodied in rule 28 of the Great
Lakes Rules (Canadian rule 29) is worded as follows:
Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any vesse, or the owner or master or
crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals,
... or of a neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary
practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case. 10
It will be noted from the wording of these rules that had the courts so
desired, they could have vitiated all the rules and allowed the excep-
tion to be the rule, rather than the rule itself.
The courts have narrowly construed these rules, and have stated in
many cases that the Special Circumstance Rule will not excuse a vio-
lation of the plain mandate of the more specific rules even though the
master may sincerely believe that his course of action was more pru-
dent, under all the circumstances, than the specific provisions of the
rules.' 7 It has been held that when construing and obeying these rules'
15 33 U.S.C.A. § 292 (Supp. 1959).
16 33 U.S.C.A. § 293 (Supp. 1959).
17 Stevens v. United States Lines Co., 187 F. 2d 670 (Ist Cir. 1951); United States v.
Woodbury, 175 F.2d 854 (1st Cit. 1949); Pure Oil Co. v. Fred B. Zigler, 105 F. Supp. 121
(E.D. La. 1952).
18The courts, when discussing the navigational rules of the road, use the unique
concept of "these rules." Through custom and tradition they refer to all the rules of
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due regard must be had to all dangers of navigation and to any special
circumstances in any particular case which may render a departure
from them necessary in order to avoid immediate danger. However,
it is categorically noted that the burden of proof must be carried by
the master alleging that he was justified in departing from the specific
rules. It has further been held that not only must the master establish,
at the time of departure, that it was necessary in order to avoid imme-
diate danger, but also that the course adopted was reasonably calcu-
lated to avoid that danger.19
In the light of this Special Circumstance Rule we must consider the
ruling of the Court in The Pennsylvania case that when a vessel has
committed a positive breach of statute, she must show not only that
probably her fault was not a cause of the disaster, "but that it could
not have been. '29 This simply means that the course of action taken by
the master, when departing from the more specific rules, must not or
could not have been the contributing cause of the collision.
A master is bound to obey the rules, and he is entitled to rely on the
assumption that the other masters will do the same; if he departs from
the rules, therefore, he does so at his own peril. As early as 1886, in
The Oregon case,2 Justice Brown stated this principle as follows:
The object of this code was to establish a uniform system of rules and regula-
tions, which should be obligatory throughout the world, taking the place of
the various and somewhat conflicting usages which had heretofore obtained
among maritime nations. As before stated, they are regarded as sufficient pro-
tection for a vessel under ordinary circumstances; and one vessel meeting
another, whether of the same or different nationality, has a right to assume
that both are governed by the same laws, and each may regulate her own con-
duct accordingly. Exceptions to these rules, though provided for by rule [now
Rule 27], should be admitted with great caution, and only when imperatively
required by the special circumstances of the case. It follows that, under all ordi-
nary circumstances, a vessel discharges her full duty and obligation to another
by a faithful and literal observance of these rules. The power to superadd to
them other requirements involves the power to determine what shall be super-
added, and in this particular there is room for a great and embarrassing diversity
of opinion. Thus, one court might hold that, in addition to displaying the regula-
tion light, a vessel at anchor should swing a torch; another, that she should ring
a bell; another, that she should blow a horn, beat a drum, or fire a cannon, and
the road in this phrase. Sometimes it is most difficult to follow their reasoning when
these general terms are used instead of more specific consideration of a particular rule.
19 States S.S. Co. v. Permanente S.S. Corp., 231 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1956); British Trans-
port Comm'n v. United States, 230 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1956); Buckeye S.S. Co. v. Union
Towing & Wrecking Co., 68 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
20 The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873). (Emphasis added.)
21 The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186 (1895).
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the result would be that a lookout would never know when he had performed
his full duty to an approaching vessel .. .
It can be seen that the courts have been adamant in their thinking
and rationale concerning a departure from the specific rules. Thus, it
is of vital importance that it be understood, in the purview of The
Pennsylvania and Oregon cases, how this Special Circumstance Rule
may be used and used properly. It might be said that under the so-
called "rare exception" and "special circumstances," a variation from
the specific rules may be made when, under all the circumstances con-
sidered as a whole, the situation is in fact one of special consideration.
Perhaps one of the best examples would be that of a vessel when
maneuvering into position alongside of its pier; that situation would
present a peculiar problem to which the specific rules could not logi-
cally apply. Also, a third vessel entering into a two vessel passing or
crossing situation could well create "circumstances" requiring special
action. And the presence of an obstruction in the water, which could
prevent normal maneuvering, has been held a special circumstance,
thereby excusing the vessel from following the more specific rules
literally. 3
In rule 28 quoted above, and known as the "General Prudential
Rule," there is, in a sense, a repetition of the "Special Circumstance
Rule."24 But it should be noted that this rule goes further and makes
it clear that the specific rules are not a complete and comprehensive
code of navigation, but rather that the basic thesis of "good seaman-
ship" is still required. And it should be added that the term "good
seamanship" is not as nebulous as one might think, for it is defined by
custom and case law.
THE ROLE OF NEGLIGENCE IN MARITIME LAW
It has been shown that a violation of a specific rule at the time of
collision will raise a presumption of fault. The time-honored concept
of "negligence" in general, however, as well as the above-mentioned
non-compliance with the rules, is a ground upon which to establish
liability. "Negligence" at sea does not differ fundamentally from
22 Id. at 202.
23 The Hoyt Case, 136 Fed. 671 (D.N.J. 1905); Cusumano v. The Curlew, 105 F. Supp.
428 (D. Mass. 1952).
24 Stevens v. United States Lines Co., 187 F. 2d 670 (1st Cir. 1951); United States v.
Woodbury, 175 F. 2d 854 (1st Cit. 1949); Pure Oil Co. v. Fred B. Zigler, 105 F. Supp. 121
(E. D. La. 1952).
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negligence ashore. It may be defined briefly as a correlative of the
very vague standards of "due care" or "good", or "prudent" seaman-
ship which appear again and again in our case law. A good example of
this is the situation when two vessels pass in close quarters: The suction
causes the smaller vessel to move toward the larger, and a collision is
the direct outcome of this close quarter maneuvering. The standards
of "prudent" and "good" navigation would require that the speed
through the water be reduced in close quarters to avoid this inevitable
result, but nowhere in the rules is this specifically covered. Similarly,
the rules hold no positive requirement as to lookouts, but one of the
surest ways for a vessel to inculpate herself is to neglect to post look-
outs.
2 5
An extremely interesting relationship between the rules and this
general concept of negligence is found in United States v. Wood-
bury.26 In this case the United States submarine Sea Owl, diving in a
designated restricted area, fouled her periscope and superstructure
with the fishing gear of the trawler vessel, Ariel. This diving area was
governed by Inland Rules of the Road, which do not require any in-
dication that the vessel is trawling, in contradistinction to the Interna-
tional Rules, which require that a trawler display a basket signal so as
to advise her status of trawling to vessels approaching.2 7 The fishing
vessel, knowing that she was in inland waters, did not display such
signal. The submarine Sea Owl was not aware of this "trawling
status" and was forced to make a quick dive to avoid collision. The
nets of the trawler were caught on the periscope sheers and destroyed.
The Court established negligence on the part of the fishing trawler,
reasoning that "good seamanship" would have required her to display
the basket or some other device to advise approaching vessels of
her trawling status condition. The Court held the fishing trawler
libale despite the lack of any statutory mandate requiring this display
of signals. This principle was stated succinctly as follows:
It does not follow, however, that the Ariel was free from fault in flying no
signal whatever to indicate the activity in which she was engaged at the time
and place of the collision, for mere literal compliance with a specific rule of
navigation is not always and under all circumstances enough to exonerate a
vessel from fault. This is so for the reason that article 29 of the Inland Rules,
33 U.S.C.A. 221, which although general in its language is just as much a
25 Stevens v. United States Lines Co., supra note 24.
26175 F. 2d 854 (1st Cir. 1949).
2733 U.S.C.A. S 145g (e) (iii) (Supp. 1959).
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statutory command as the rules couched in more specific terms, provides in
pertinent part:
"Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner or master or
crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry . . .signals...
or ... neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary prac-
tice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case."
This rule requires, in addition to bare compliance with the literal provisions
of some specific rule, the adoption either of such additional precautions as it
is the ordinary practice of seamen to take in a particular situation, or of such
additional precautions as the special circumstances of the particular case
demand. 28
The view of the Supreme Court in this subject area is perhaps best
exemplified in these words from The Oregon case:
Undoubtedly, where the circumstances of the case are such as to demand
unusual care, such care should be exercised. . . .The Code, however, is sup-
posed to make provision for all ordinary cases. 29
It is under the general negligence doctrine that the newest and
most misunderstood aid to safe navigation finds its logical place. The
reference here is to the electronic marvel known as radar. The rules
do not as yet speak specifically on this important topic, but the case
law approaches the use and the possession of radar under the general
concept of negligence. The possession of radar is not of itself required,
but it. is this author's opinion that in the not too distant future, radar
will be considered an indispensable constituent of the seaworthy ves-
sel, and will be incorporated into the statutory requirement much
tihe same as the running lights, mast head lights, prescribed whistle,
and fog signals.30 It is interesting to note that the United States Coast
Guard has established that after May 1, 1962, every radar equipped
vessel of 300 gross tons and over which is issued a Certificate of In-
spection for navigation on ocean, coastwise, or Great Lakes waters
shall have in its required complement of deck officers (including the
master), only officers who have qualified as "radar observers. ' 31
THE DILEMMA OF RADAR
The general area of radar has come beofre our admiralty courts
indirectly under the aegis of any added obligation to use radar once
it has been installed on the vessel. This thinking has manifested itself
in The Medford;3 2 the ship in that case was equipped with radar but
28 United States v. Woodbury, 175 F. 2d 854, 861-862 (1st Cir. 1949).
2 9 The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 201 (1895).
30 Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 158 (D. Mass. 1950).
3125 Fed. Reg. 3969 (1960).
32 65 F. Supp. 622 (E. D. N.Y. 1946).
UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN ADMIRALTY LAW
did not, ii prudence, make use of it. The Medford steamed into a
fog bank without activating its electronic gear and was held at fault
for this "negligent act of omission." It has been argued in many
quarters that the shipowner who equips his vessels with radar is held
to a greater degree of liability in the event of a subsequent collision,
than his counterpart who does not see fit to provide this technical
advantage. It is suggested that this interpretation could be a deter-
rent to the increased use of radar without a mandatory rule requiring
its installation; the courts have actually discouraged, and in some
sense "penalized," the shipowner who installs radar for the safety of
his ship.
Many of the first cases discussing this question of possession and
use of radar have stemmed from collisions during the convoy oper-
ations of World War II. In United States v. The Australia Star,33 a
vessel was held at fault for failing to keep another vessel under radar
observation after she herself had turned on her running lights. The
court seems to indicate that The Australia Star, having established
radar contact, was negligent in failing to continue to plot and analyze
the course and speed on The Hindoo (the other vessel involved).
In the exact words of the court:
Had her master contined to call for radar reports, the information so obtained
should have suggested to him that his assumption that the Hindoo could and
would keep out of the way was incorrect and might have enabled him to take
some avoiding action.8 4
From this and various other cases it can be seen that if the vessels
had not been equipped with radar, their obligation and responsibility
to use this device would not have been raised before the court.
The courts have extended the age-old doctrine of seaworthiness
into the field of radar. This question was not on all fours in the
Timur Fishing Corp. case. 5 Judge Aldrich pointed out the doctrine
of seaworthiness and its relationship to the possession and maintenance
of radar in the following words:
Therefore I would not find her unseaworthy to have a radar that was less
than 100% perfect, so long as its limitations were apparent and known. In-
stallation and maintenance difficulties would have been involved-to have placed
the radar screen so that no blind spot existed.8s
83 172 F. 2d. 472 (2d Cir. 1949).
34 Id. at 475-476.
35 Timur Fishing Corp. v. Cap'n Bill, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mass. 1958).
86 Id. at 564.
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Another court's attitude is found in British Transport Comm'n v.
United States 7
At this point it is well to refer to the Duke's radar. Its use would have avoided
the collision and its unavailableness was due to neglect of repair. There was
ample warning-a day or two-of its disrepair. Had it been in operation, the
situation so urgently demanding its services, omission to use it would clearly
have been negligence. However, as the Duke of York's excessive speed was the
predominant fault leading to the collision, it is not necessary in this case to
pass upon the question of whether or not, in the absence of statute requiring
radar, a lack of diligence in maintaining existing radar facilities is negligence.38
From these leading cases one could possibly conclude that both the
Judiciary and those responsible for the safe navigation of vessels need
a statutory enactment covering this most important subject.The Canadian rules and the American Great Lakes rules require
that fog signals be used only "whenever there is thick weather by
reason of fog, mist, falling snow, heavy rainstorms, or other causes,
whether by day or by night. . . ." The crossing signals as required
by these rules are to be used only when the vessels are visible to
each other. As has been pointed out previously, the primary purpose
of fog signals is to advise other vessels of the status of all vessels in
the vicinity. After this status has been ascertained, the master is then
called upon to make his prudent judgment as to his course of action
within the purview of "good seamanship" and "due care." Assuming
that radar, with competent interpretation of its electronic signal, lifts
the veil of "thick weather," thereby placing the various ships in the
status of perfect visibility, one is faced with the problem of being
caught on both horns of a dilemma: On one horn, if a client whose
ship has radar is advised to follow the statutory rules requiring exe-
cution of the fog signal, one is forced to the conclusion that a ship
visible on radar is really not "visible." On the other horn, if a client
is advised to completely ignore the statutory requirement of the fog
signal, based upon the assumption that the vessel is "visible" on the
radar screen, in the event of collision the client is cast in fault under
The Pennsylvania doctrine.40
A very recent case, Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. United States,41
37 230 F. 2d 139 (4th Cir. 1956); Petition of the United States, 131 F. Supp. 712, 717
(E. D. Va. 1955).
a8 Id. at 142.
39 33 U.S.CA.. S 271 (Supp. 1959).
40 The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873).
41 174 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
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has discussed the very point of liability set out above. In HWeyer-
haeuser, two vessels, both having radar and using it to observe each
other, managed to use this radar observation to bring themselves to
the exact same position at the same time in collision; this is known
as a radar assisted collision. During the course of maneuvering into
collision, one of the vessels made at least one or two course changes,
while the other one made three course changes. These vessels were
heading towards each other and during the time of their radar obser-
vations, one of the vessels changed course to port while the other one
made three course changes to starboard based on its radar observation.
Rule 18 of the Great Lakes rules provides: "When two steam
vessels are meeting end on, or nearly end on, ...each [vessel] shall
alter her course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side
of the other. '42 The record discloses that one of these vessels, after
detecting the other, changed her course to starboard in accordance
with this rule 18, but the other vessel, knowing this course change,
managed to turn to port, thereby bringing her back on a collision
course. The principle of this case is quoted as follows:
Rule 18, written before the advent of radar as an aid to navigation, specifically
refers to instances in which the vessels or their lights are visible to each other.
This court can see no reason why its application should not extend to a situa-
tion in which two vessels "see" each other by radar.
It is argued that under the conditions of the instant case a right turn was
not warranted because neither vessel could know that the other had radar
and abide by the rules. 48
The court in answer to the objection that the passing rules do not
apply in the fog, further developed its thesis as follows:
But even if the Pacific had not had radar and had maintained a straight course,
a right turn by the Weyerhaeuser would have avoided the collision and the same
is true if the situation is reversed. Certainly, a left turn was totally unjustified.
It is difficult to see how application of Rule 18 under these conditions would
have anything but a positive effect upon safety.
Two cases are cited in support of the position that the meeting and passing
rules do not apply in fog. Borcich v. Ancich, 9 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 392; The
George F. Randolph, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1912, 200 F.96. Both are' distinguishable
from the instant case. In the former, fog made the burdened vessel unable to de-
termine that there was another vessel to starboard, and in the latter, both vessels
were uncertain of each other's location in the fog. 4
42 33 U.S.C.A. S 282 (Supp. 1959).
48 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 663, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
(Emphasis added.)
44 Ibid.
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In this case both vessels knew the location and the exact course of
the other vessel. The court concluded, after distinguishing the Bor-
cich case and the Randolph case, that both these vessels were bound
to turn to starboard under the same situation as if they could have
seen each other and that rule 18, which specifically required this
course of action was applicable, notwithstanding the fact that their
"seeing each other" was based on radar observations.
The foregoing discussion of the relatively new concept of radar as
applied to the nautical rules of the road indicates the necessity for
the consideration and resolution of a most difficult problem by the
legislatures of both Canada and the United States. An attempt has
been made to provoke thinking concerning both this question of radar
in admiralty and the problem of the rebuttable fault doctrine. It
would seem that these problems, by their nature, are so closely inter-
woven between the Canadian waters and those of the United States,
that perhaps a very closely knit working committee should be estab-
lished: The recommendations worked out as a joint venture could
be of untold importance to the future development of the St. Law-
rence Seaway and the Great Lakes.
